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IS GLOBALIZATION A CODE WORD FOR AMERICANIZATION?

Contemplating McDonalds, Coca-Cola, and military bases

In ‘Is Globalization a code word for Americanization?’, the author shows how globalization scholarship ignores the role of the American nation-state in shaping that process, while Americanists and historians of American history have had a blind spot in seeing the u.s. in global terms. Cast as a weak nation-state institutionally and anti-imperial in comparison with European colonial powers, scholarship had a difficulty to see the u.s. state as a global actor. Globalization, however, cannot be understood without analyzing the hegemonic power of the u.s. nation-state that has been crucial in shaping international and transnational politics and institutions during the twentieth century. Future research will therefore have to analyze in a historically grounded fashion the u.s. nation-state in relationship with corporate business and civil-society organizations to map the politics and institutions that have shaped globalization in the era that has been rightfully called the ‘American Century’.

In 1949, French communists, local brewers, and wine farmers posed the vexed question: ‘Are we in danger of being “coca-colonized”’ when in 1949 the American Coca-Cola factory sought to expand its French operations in Marseilles. The expansion threatened to replace the celebrated French wine and the local beverages.1 Fifty years later, French farmers protested u.s. trade policy towards the European Union smashing Coke machines. And faced with the bombs of u.s. let NATO forces in May of 1999, Serbs in Belgrade broke the windows of McDonalds.2 In the past century or so, other historical incidents also show that social actors have viewed Americanization and market domination as one and the same. Recently, anti-globalists portray globalization as an American neo-liberal project, accusing u.s.-based multinational corporations to have severely magnified the trade conflicts and job insecurity, exploited indigenous resources, and threatened local culture. It critiques u.s.-

based corporations of selling standardized products, pushing homogenization, and creating false consciousness to the detriment of local communities, the working class and the poor. In this critique, McDonalds and Coca-Cola are the quintessential symbols of American-led globalization.

Boosters of globalization beg to differ. They insist anti-globalists confuse globalization and Americanism, opposing for example the notion that a global system exists directed by one state. They also point out that dominant economic power does not necessarily translate into an immediate cultural impact: culture has the ability for hybridization in the confrontation with other cultures; moreover, consumers are active and creative agents not the victims in that process.3 Defenders of globalization also argue that its critics often encode their critique of America with values that have little to do with the u.s. When the American brand Nike bore the brunt for the excesses of the global factory, for example, the German multi-national shoemaker corporation Adidas faced no protests at all.

These opposing views beg the question to what extent globalization is a codeword for or, at least closely related to, u.s. global power and influence during the twentieth century.4 What indeed is the relationship of globalization with the American Century, to cite the term the TIME magazine publisher Henry Luce famously coined the Twentieth Century in 1938?5 Would globalization have developed the way it did during the twentieth century had the United States not committed its public policy to promoting an international economic system as the world’s leading economic and military power in the twentieth century? Is Americanization different from, a subset of, or a codeword for globalization in the twentieth century?

Both of these phenomena are complex; each the subject of their own cotton industry. I have chosen a more limited approach by considering the American century as a historically specific phenomenon and reviewing existent periodization of u.s. commercial exports, u.s. military and American culture to assess the issue. After reviewing to what extent current scholarship provides the potential building blocks to answer these questions, the article shifts to a historically inflected approach by reviewing current periodization of American history to situate the process of Americanization in a global and historically specific context before suggesting a set of possible research questions.

Americanization and Globalization: The Nebulous Connection

Most historically-minded skeptics argue globalization is not historically unprecedented or simply rendering the nation-state irrelevant and homogenizing culture. Instead, globalization often reinforces regionalism and nationalism. It cannot be retraced simply to one author like the u.s.6 Such a tempered view of the relationship between American expansion and globalization is reinforced by recent trends in American Studies scholarship. American Studies scholars, for instance, have shown how expressions of anti-Americanism offer a window into the anxieties about national identity and modernity or into the tensions of economic development: anti-Americanism should therefore not only be read as a measure of American direct and oppressive influence.7 Their work has offered many twentieth-century European examples of debates that were conducted in oppositional terms between the u.s. and Europe but actually camouflaged a national rhetoric serving local needs. In Britain, to cite just one example, arguments for the preservation of state-sponsored BBC system found their convenient rhetorical opposite in the u.s. as a degenerated country, where greed, commercialism, and bad taste guided the media market system.8 In such debates America often served as a dangerous ‘other’, serving domestic politics.9 Non-u.s. based American Studies scholars, in particular, have pioneered studies that document how anti-American protest abroad is often far more diffuse than in the case of French Coca-Cola demonstrators who marched against one very visible American multinational in 1949. There is now a broad consensus that Americanization refers to a cultural transformation that has only in part to do with the American nation-state and u.s. based multinationals, but often marks a semiotic sign floating outside its geographical bounds. America in this sense represents a kind of offshore America, constructed outside the u.s., called America.10 This scholarly literature would lead to the conclusion that only a very weak connection exists between Americanization and globalization or that Americanization should be understood as merely a cultural process of appropriation of global trends.

6. David Held e.a., Global transformations: politics, economics, and culture (Cambridge 1999).
8. On both sides of that debate, the oppositional framing of the issue ignored actual practice. After all, the British were imbued with their own imperial chauvinism, while the American media system enjoyed far more state involvement than the discourse would suggest.
10. For summary of this literature, Richard Pells, Not like us. How Europeans have loved, hated, and transformed American culture since World War II (New York 1997); for a critical assessment, see: Mel van Elteren, Americanism and americanization. A critical history of domestic and global influence (London 2006).
Is globalization a code word for americanization?

If America is a floating sign constructed outside its geographical bounds, it begs the question, though, ‘where in the world is America?’ to cite the thought-provoking article with that title. In it, authors Charles Bright and Michael Geyer seek to situate the history of the United States in global terms. The authors play on America’s uncanny ability to be everywhere and nowhere at the same time: omnipresent globally, but territorially deterritorialized. International relations’ scholar Joseph Nye, the former assistant secretary of defense and international security who influenced the Clinton administration on foreign policy and its support for global markets, has made a claim to fame in trying to capture that phenomenon. He introduced the notion of ‘soft power’ – the seductive power of McDonalds and Coca-Cola or the inherent appeal of u.s. style democracy – to describe America’s supposedly unique exercise of global power during the twentieth century.

Ill. 1  Photo for a Coca-Cola campaign. Fitting a signboard to the wall of a café, the Netherlands 1952. Photo: Ben van Meerendonk. Collection ii sg bg b28/127

He argues that this disembodied power, the ability to getting others to want what you want, is far more important for America's hegemony than the hard power of military might. Michael Negri and Antonio Hardt also subscribe to a deterritorialized notion of the U.S., defining America in the twentieth century as an empire spread across an unbounded terrain: a networked, not a landed empire. Their scripting of American history is evocative, indeed, but it casts America as a topos without geography or as a global economic force without historical actors or institutions. To them, America represents the engine of capitalism that is everywhere and nowhere. Though radically different in political outlook Nye, Negri and Hardt thus mobilize a discourse of a deterritorialized nature of America's global power to explain its supremacy in the postwar era. It is a power that cannot be fixed in time and place. They consider Americanization, if at all, as a subset or phase of the larger move towards globalization. Following this line of reasoning it would seem that U.S. military superiority during the twentieth century has little to do with economic choices on the global stage or the globalization process during the same period.

If Negri, Hardt, and Nye's descriptions of U.S. global power lack any geographical precision, political scientist Chalmers Johnson on the other hand has mapped the exact location of America's hard power, by identifying all American military installations abroad. Johnson, a lapsed cold-warrior, focuses on the American military omnipresence. In his trilogy on America's foreign policy, he argues that the U.S. is not an empire of colonies but an empire of bases connected through a chain of command and the Pentagon without real civilian oversight. This global network of military bases are in the business of maintaining absolute power, sustaining communication and control through eavesdropping stations, keeping economic control of petroleum flows, preserving an institutional income system for the military-industrial complex, and maintaining an extraterritorial comfort zone for dependents with social, medical benefits which include clubs, apartments, gyms, golf courses, swimming pools, and shopping malls – amenities often inaccessible to the troops of lower-class and ethnic background at home in the continental U.S. His important contribution is to show the global span of U.S. military power has become closely intertwined with the building and expansion of large technical systems.

This kind of globalization of American power is nowhere to be found in current historiography on Americanization and globalization. On the whole, in considering the phenomena studies ignore the so-called hard power – be it the state, the corporation, or the military. As the scholar of Americanization in France Richard Kuisel correctly points out, ‘it is a mistake to discount American political, economic, and military dominance and to explain the success of American mass culture or consumer products simply by their inherent appeal’. Americanization has to some degree, ‘depended on market control, on advertising, and even on political leverage’. On their part, scholars of international affairs and diplomatic history in discussing American power in terms of military bases and geopolitics have not been able to speak credibly about the economic forces of globalization, the corporate America’s relationship to the military, or how most people living outside the U.S. experience and negotiate its supremacy on a daily basis. Why has it been so hard theoretically or historically to see how Coca-Cola and McDonald’s global corporate practices and military bases are connected to understand globalization and Americanization in the twentieth century as interrelated phenomena, when historical actors did insist on the connection?

Several factors have caused the myopia of American Studies and U.S. diplomacy to see America in globally connected terms. First, the belief in America’s exceptionalism and in its lack of an overseas empire, suspends it from historical analysis. The second belief is that the U.S. has a weak nation-state apparatus. And because America is neither a traditional empire nor possesses a strong state apparatus compared to European nations, it therefore misses the directional force in shaping globalization. Third, understanding the relationship between Americanization and globalization further suffers from a weak conceptionalization of America’s institutional role in the globalization literature. In the dominant historiography of America’s role in the world the exact connection between Americanization and globalization remains therefore rather nebulous.

The notion of America’s exceptionalist position is fully embraced by most ordinary Americans, who, while understanding their country in global terms, are unable to grasp the U.S. in geographical terms. Significantly, this popular geographical illiteracy contrasts starkly with the immense governmental resources devoted to geographical intelligence by the American government and the military, according to Neil Smith. Americans persist in understanding the United States not merely as a non-Empire but even an anti-Empire, while also believing it is the greatest nation in the world that is the guiding light for others. The idea that the United States wields global power in a fundamentally different fashion than earlier European colonial empires is America’s liturgy, in which ‘empire’ is considered a distinctly dirty word.

It has been a routine too that U.S. imperialism in the period after 1898 until the First World War when it acquired an overseas empire (Cuba, Philippines, and Hawaii etc.) should be seen as an aberration. As diplomatic Progressive historian William Appleman Williams succinctly captured the emerging consensus of his generation in 1955, ‘One of the central themes of American historiography is that there is no American Empire’. Even if dealing with the period between 1898 until 1914, ‘most historians will admit, if pressed, that the United States once had an empire. They then promptly insist that it was given away’. He also pointed to the great irony that while denying the existence of an American Empire, historians ‘also speak persistently of America as a World Power’.

The U.S. was—and still is—somehow considered exceptional because of its non-entangling alliances, anti-imperialism, isolationism, or otherwise because of its unique mission of universal freedom that is deterritorialized.

In short, both in the popular imagination as in conventional scholarship, American power is considered beyond geography: spaceless yet everywhere at the same time.

22. European historians have noted the basic incompatibility of the claim of America’s uniqueness with its globalizing civilizing mission, most eloquently expounded by Wilson and his followers. Serge Richard as quoted by Michael Adas, ‘From settler colony to global hegemony: integrating the exceptionalist narrative of the American experience into world history’, American Historical Review 106: 5 (2001) 1692-1720.
Since September 11, 2001, an extraordinary paradigmatic shift has occurred in the public discourse. The idea that America is perhaps an ordinary empire appears in hundreds of book and article titles since that day. At first sight, it seems to represent an extraordinary radical shift. Throughout the decades from the 1930s to 1960s, Progressive and New Left scholars who had questioned the view that the U.S. global role was exceptionalist, arguing that America’s outward thrust had always been part and parcel in building the nation-state, found themselves marginalized as a cold-war consensus emerged about America’s unique and exceptionalist role in the world. In later decades, cultural studies and development studies de-emphasized the U.S. state as an important actor because they sought to decenter the powerful and the West in their effort to pay much needed attention to local communities. 

The net result though has been a remarkable blind spot. Although progressive historians have made a remarkable comeback in finding odd bedfellows in neo-conservatives who have sought to embrace the idea of empire asserting America should throw off its mantle of embarrassment and act as a world power. But the new right’s vogue to speak about the U.S. with distinct imperial ambitions has often little to do with global interconnectedness or the scholarly traditions of global history. This blind spot does not only afflict the neo-conservatives. It is deeply and structurally embedded in U.S. academic curricula as well. On American campuses the global role of the U.S. in American history is separately taught from world history. In 2002, American historian Thomas Bender still observed a tendency in both academic and popular discourse to think of America ‘here’ and the international ‘over there’.


an ‘intellectual provincialism’ that privileges the work of u.s.-based scholars over non-u.s. based Americanists, as Shelly Fisher Fishkin remarked in her 2004 presidential address to the American Studies Association. It prevents American Studies and American historians to fully analyze the u.s. in transnational and global terms as a matter of practice.27

The second severe blind spot in the Americanist literature represents the inability to speak about the American nation-state in a fruitful manner. The fuzziness centers both the American nation as the American state. Americans believe in the extraordinary sovereignty of the American nation-state divorced from the rest of the world. It is a belief in the true and absolute independence of a robust nation, safely squared away on a vast continent that can do without anybody else.28 What is extraordinary, as American historian Walter LaFeber has pointed out, is that while many other peoples and nations nurtured similar national belief systems of their exceptionalism (the French, Swiss, South Africans to cite a few), the u.s. has been incredibly lucky to harness the hard power (economic, technological and military) that validated that national belief in its exceptionalism.29 But while there a strong sense of America as a nation, a deep understanding of America as a state is lacking. Most scholars have had a difficult time talking about an American nation-state apparatus in the same fashion as discussing histories of European countries and empires. Americans’ knee-jerk aversion against the state and their strong belief in individualism is in part to blame. It is perhaps not surprising that American Studies’ scholarship similarly suffers from a weakness in analyzing the workings of the American nation-state as an institutional actor on the global stage. In these historiographical currents, in short, America is overdetermined as an exceptional nation, underdetermined as a state actor, and divorced from the global context.

The third blind spot comes from globalization studies concerning the American nation-state. In globalization theories, the role of the u.s. nation-state is undertheorized failing to keep a sustained focus on its emergence as a related phenomenon to the u.s. role as a superpower. During the 1970s – when globalization was not yet coined as a term –, political scientist Immanuel Wallerstein proposed a model to understand the country’s developments in relationship to each other that together made up a ‘world system’. In this frame, the u.s. role in the globalization process represents just one phase

28. Political scientist Benjamin R. Barber, Fear’s empire. War, terrorism, and democracy (New York 2003) also the author of the bestseller jihad vs. MacWorld that attracted Bill Clinton’s attention and figured prominently in the 1990s public discussions on globalization.
in the development of world systems that needs no further explanation.\textsuperscript{30} Others too argue that the U.S. took over Britain’s economic position after the First World War, simply finishing globally what the Kingdom had started: an extension of industrial capitalism under a new master. The only real difference was that unlike their British counterparts the American actors showed an ambivalence towards global engagement. For example, in the U.S. Midwestern farmers with their massive integrated domestic market competed with Southern cotton plantation owners whose exports tied them to the global economy.\textsuperscript{31} British policy makers in contrast were routinely willing to sacrifice some domestic economic goals in the interest of stability on international markets for goods and capital because Britain’s domestic prosperity depended on its international ties.

Some scholars have been willing to discuss the U.S. role. Robert Gilpin constructs globalization as a form of internationalization that is a byproduct of an U.S. initiated multilateral economic order. He argues it is U.S. political leadership that shaped international economic management and created an impetus for the liberalization of national economies. The influential publicist Thomas Friedman also believes that globalization has a distinctly American face (or ‘Americanization-globalization,’ as he calls it), but he describes it as a process that is inevitable but not politically guided. In his rendition, U.S. neo-liberalism of free trade, free markets, consumer choice, and democracy is not historically or geographically specific.\textsuperscript{32} In short, the theoretical literature neither about globalization nor American Studies offers a sustained examination of the relationship between Americanization and globalization. Instead of approaching the issue theoretically, in the next section I therefore turn to historical studies to tease out the relationship: What do we actually know about the U.S. global role on the world stage? How have historian’s periodized American history in terms of its global role and what social actors have they identified in the process? What insights do they render that might be useful to the globalization debate?

\textsuperscript{31} Thomas L. Friedman, \textit{The lexus and the olive tree: understanding globalization} (New York 1999) 728.
Globalization: A Question of History?

The period prior to the Second World War is generally understood as an era of America’s reluctant participation in world affairs because of its supposed non-entangling alliances and anti-imperialism (1830-1898). All historians view the Spanish-American-Cuban war of 1898 – the seemingly natural endpoint of that period – as a historical moment of rupture. As we have seen, traditional diplomatic historians consider the 1898 overseas expansion as an – unfortunate – accident; revisionists argue the war represents America’s expansionist vision that had always been part of the Republic’s fabric. Similarly, historians cast the interbellum period (1919-1941) as America’s principle period of isolationism after a brief interlude of its appearance on Europe’s world stage. It is only with the post-World War II period when it was once again forced to commit itself globally after the Japanese 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor that the U.S. took on its global responsibility. Such a narrative of American history is far too simple, however.

Reluctant globalization? U.S. Overseas Expansion, 1860-1941

The first pillar supporting the idea that the U.S. has been a reluctant global player comes from the scripting of U.S. pre-First World War history as an era characterized solely by economic expansion void of any state intervention. The American state indeed considered powerful European nations generally in exclusive economic terms during the period between the American Civil War and the First World War (1860 to 1914). That may have been true for Europe, but U.S. policy makers did view the Western Hemisphere and Asia in expansive geopolitical terms just like their European colonial counterparts. U.S. foreign policy aggressively sought to open markets by combining it with the establishment of a naval power around the globe when European states were engaged in the imperial power grab in Africa, for example. In particular, the U.S. eyed the Caribbean basin for geopolitical purposes. Through military build-up and numerous interventions, the U.S. sought to control Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the Canal Zone for easy movement of commercial shipping and warships between the Atlantic and Pacific to avoid the longer route rounding Cape Horn. It supported military interventions in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua and it established naval stations in Hawaii and Manila to bridge the route to Asia. Thus supported by the U.S. government and the navy, American rubber companies bought plantations in Sumatra, American sugar producers expanded in Cuba, American meat packers enlarged their business in South America, and American paper companies opened paper mills in Canada; American mining companies bought up nitrate, iron, and copper mines in Chile, and American oil companies explored China, the Dutch Indies, and Mexico. Expansion also came
through the circulation of American-based engineering knowledge. Once the continental United States had completed its nation building through large infrastructural projects and the Western frontier had been mentally closed, scores of American engineers with working experiences in the construction of the American West traveled the entire globe to apply their expertise abroad.\(^33\) Thus, when the U.S. tried to control the Western Hemisphere and gain access to Asia, it practiced a foreign strategy decidedly geopolitical and global in scope.

A second pillar in the scripting of America as an exceptional global power has been the framing of the interbellum period (1919 and 1941) as the premier era of isolationism when America (or Wilson) failed to stay internationally involved. Some scholars view this period as an era of disrupted globalization or even deglobalization, arguing that international economic system malfunctioned or broke down.\(^34\) Others scholars acknowledge a measure of global engagement, but dispute the existence of a well-thought out foreign policy pointing to how several American government agencies worked at cross-purposes. By contrast, historian of Japanese-American relations Akira Iriye believes we should consider the period as a confirmation of America as a world power rather than as a temporary setback. An exclusive focus on military-political actions and on Europe misses America’s extraordinary global expansion in other sectors and geographical locations, he argues. Militarily the U.S. committed itself further to Latin America, Asia, and the Pacific, while economically, financially, and culturally it expanded in Europe during these decades. American bankers, with Washington officials’ approval, sought to work out a scheme to stabilize the European currency system and helped in reparations plans and debt payments.\(^35\) To view America’s actions during this time as isolationist not only represents a Eurocentric view of globalization, he argues. It also narrows the definition of America’s global engagements exclusively to geopolitical terms.\(^36\)

\(^{33}\) Carroll W. Pursell Jr., The machine in America: a social history of technology (Baltimore 1998) chapter 8; Adas, Dominance, chapter 3.


\(^{35}\) It also invested heavily in Europe, even if some government agencies, such as the Federal Reserve System kept feeling the pressures of the opposite camps of the domestic and the global interests. American governments and financial institutions tried to repair an international financial system, if hesitantly.

Indeed, as diplomatic historian Emily Rosenberg has persuasively argued, the U.S. government played a decisive role in the expansion of media and popular culture industries and the further development of information and communication technologies – the very sectors that have come to symbolize globalization to its theorists. Although the Americanization process and U.S.’ global reach during the interbellum period is mostly associated with cultural expansion void of any economic and political settings, the global expansion of American cultural forms have been extraordinarily successful; it was during the interbellum that American firms enjoyed a comparative advantage in the global media and popular cultures industries because of its huge domestic market that offered the advantages of economies of scale. The U.S. government was actively engaged in the expansionist developments of privately owned media, particular during times of hot and cold wars when export of information, film and radio transformed into American specialty products. The U.S. governments’ war propaganda agency broke the London monopoly in film for Hollywood during the First World War. As a result of that government policy, 95 percent of films shown in Britain and Canada, 70 percent in France and 80 percent in South America were Hollywood productions. This policy continued even after the war when in 1926 the U.S. State Department actively promoted American films by breaking up protection of other countries despite European countries’ failed attempt to counter the policy through the League of Nations. American movies thus gained hegemony over international markets not because of their inherent appeal, but also because of savvy political maneuvering of the U.S. government during times of war and peace in collaboration with American business interests. In these settings, building information, communication, and media networks developed in tandem with the culture production in which the U.S. government was closely involved.

In analyzing the U.S. role in globalization, moreover, it is vital to understand how internationalism and Americanization became blended phenomena particularly during the period in which the U.S. government has been seen as generally isolationist. A number of case studies have mapped the ways American non-state actors such as civil-society organizations have been important vectors of American-style globalism. American expansion occurred through

civil-society organizations that were closely tied to the government. During the early twentieth century, a number of philanthropic foundations based on the fortunes of nineteenth-century robber barons engaged in global philanthropy. Carnegie built public libraries in u.s. and British Dominions. The Rockefeller Foundation funded medical and scientific research, public health, education, and international exchange programs fighting yellow fever and African tropical diseases; it funded the China Medical Board in China, the Union Medical College in Beijing, and established women’s colleges in Asia. The Guggenheim Foundation funded Latin American intellectuals. The u.s. based Boy Scouts International and Rotary clubs exported American-style internationalism that even attracted the German writer Thomas Mann, who became an active member of the Rotary Club of Dresden.40 The Institute of International Education funded foreign students in Asia, Latin America and Europe to study in the u.s. Many international organizations such as the International Office of Museums, International Congress on Popular Arts, and the International Society for Contemporary Music that had been established during this time also received active American backing and funding.41

These case studies show how civil-society organizations, state interventions, and financial institutions question the interbellum period as an era of isolationism and deglobalization. Seen through the lens of economic, financial, cultural, and civil-society institutions, American global engagement was marked by great global interest and international intensity between the world wars instead of by isolationism.

American-led Globalization since 1945

The historiography on the u.s. global rule for the prewar period is uneven when it comes to the role of the u.s. nation-state. The nature of America’s global leadership after 1945, however, is not in dispute. One would therefore expect that the postwar era offers a better chance to understanding the u.s. role in the process of globalization. After all, the post-Second World War era (1945-1972) brings into sharp focus a new global partnership among an activist American state, corporate business-union coalition, and international non-governmental organizations that closely collaborated on the basis of a shared global vision and strategy. If the 1945 Yalta system had still operated under the idea of power sharing with the Soviet Union, China, Britain, and other European Nations, that arrangement changed radically with the begin-

ning of the Cold War in 1949. The Cold War reframed American-style internationalism into American globalism. American Cold-War globalism was all embracing even if it also resulted in delinking of international systems and regions because of ostracizing the communist part of the world. This cold-war global reordering combined a set of tools of control involving military (alliance systems and interventions), economic (dollar aid and investments), political (leverage and sanctions as superpower), and cultural (image of America as leader of the free world) means. The combination was tremendously powerful and involved both hard and soft powers, economic prowess, military hardware, and cultural authority.42

What is truly remarkably, though, is that despite the visible and powerful presence on the world stage of the u.s. government, its military, and multinationals, their precise role in the globalization process is still nebulous and undertheorized. There is a broad consensus that during the postwar period, the years between 1945 and 1972 mark an era of classic Americanization. What we do know is that under the leadership of the American nation-state and the military, the u.s. government aligned with Big Business to lead a new kind of international corporatism. The coalition involved industry, but also union organizations, academic networks, religious establishment, and the popular culture industries. The new corporatism was an outcome of an American government that had established an international financial system (Bretton Woods) that came to determine the global economy with new institutions, such as the World Bank, IMF, and GATT after taking off in 1958. At the same time, American multinational corporations became a new international phenomenon. Unlike their European predecessors, American multinationals emerged in manufacturing sector rather than agriculture and mining: they pushed for integrated global management and aggressively competed with local companies for domination. U.S. corporations became closely aligned to the American federal government, despite the strong articulation of a free-market ideology and wariness of state intervention. The American aviation industry, to cite one example among many, benefited from the wartime cooperation with the government: the Boeing Company, Douglas, and Lockheed who all boomed because of federal war contracts would dominate the expanding world market in civilian aviation in peacetime with government assistance. And because of its world domination, the American-based International Civil Aviation Organization (1947) pushed global rules and standards for air navigation codes, established mechanisms for civil disputes, and pushed simpler procedures at borders.

The development of the media and popular culture industries further developed the government-corporate alliance when culture became a crucial tool for foreign diplomacy to win the hearts and minds of foreign citizens.

42. Bright and Geyer, ‘Where in the world?’, 63-100.
during the cold war. President Truman first launched culture diplomacy; his successor President Eisenhower aggressively institutionalized it by establishing educational exchanges (Fulbright), the U.S. Information Agency, and many propaganda campaigns based on aggressive wartime techniques. As part of that offensive, the CIA for example funded Congress for Cultural Freedom and helped organize the labor movement through the AFL to stamp out communist organizations in Europe. Voice of America, European Recovery Program, Marshall Plan Freedom Trains, and Selling of Abundance campaign were all part of it. These campaigns came from a longer tradition first begun during the First World War and later continued in the Western Hemisphere where in 1939 Roosevelt started a cultural offensive with Office of Inter-American Affairs when he appointed Rockefeller to direct mass communication messages with the help of Disney Studios. It became the model for the Office of War Information during the Second World War. It blanketed 28 overseas libraries with cheap editions of American books and 24-hour programs in 40 languages; demanded advance view of film scripts to ban gangsters, slums, Okies, and labor strife; and gave army commissions to directors. In occupied Germany and Japan after the war, the Allies embarked on an aggressive denazification and Americanization program that involved ‘re-education’ further globalizing American models. Funds were dispensed for the free translation of American books; newspapers were reorganized to fit American advertising practices; and the school systems were also changed to American educational methods. In Japan, American policies pushed for equal rights for middleclass women and labor by stamping out union radicalism. U.S. officials censored negative views about the influence of the atomic bomb. Film scripts avoided militarism, nationalism, suicide, and degradation of women. Instead, it encouraged sexual expression, women’s rights, the new constitution, and baseball. Or, as a Japanese film director summarized it: screen, sports, and sex. The American styled globalism that merged an economic and military complex with a cultural production was probably unique. One finds little of it in theories of globalization, however.

After the era of classic Americanization, U.S. global power faced multiple political and military challenges. Despite its vulnerability and diminishing economic power, however, it is remarkable how the U.S. has been able to put ‘a heavy stamp on today corporate globalization’, as Americanist and sociologist Mel van Elteren correctly argues. Between 1979 and 1993, America’s global economic power and ideological appeal stood probably at its apex. The U.S. lost its global centrality but, despite the new assertiveness of the oil producing countries (OPEC), the Third World movement, and the nationalistic

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44. Van Elteren, Americanization and americanism, 196.
policies of the Reagan administration pushing new geopolitical alliances and world regions, American based business leaders began to develop global networks outside the state that sought to exercise influence over politicians including the 1973 Trilateral Commission Rockefeller, Davos, and World Economic Forum during 1980s.45

From the late 1970s, U.S. business leaders sought to actively contain unions pushing for an agenda of deregulations, tax cuts, and free trade at the very moment that European countries also started to reevaluate their welfare-state arrangements. This anti-regulatory drive ultimately resulted in the neo-conservative movement under Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. The debates, policies, and new power bases of deregulation in turn pushed international society and economy everywhere. In the U.S., American corporate funds established new institutions such as the Heritage Foundation, Cato Institute, and Olin Foundation linking a whole new financial, intellectual, and political network of free-market think tanks, lobby groups, and publications that made its influence felt at the World Bank, UNESCO, WHO, and UNCTAD.46 This new political paradigm would find its most eloquent expression under the Bush administration whose close ties to these multinational corporations was both intense and personal.

45. During 1950s, U.S. corporatism had marked a unique alliance between the government and the social partners that exported the Rooseveltian New Deal between government, business, and unions. It was followed by a period in the 1970s when American consumer organizations began to successfully institute state protection and intervention in the marketplace and sought to globalize these consumer protections. Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam (eds.), The cultural cold war in Western Europe, 1945-1960 (London 2003) part II.

Is globalization a code word for americanization?

Here too one cannot avoid discussing the movement of globalization without examining the long march of the U.S. neo-conservative and deregulation lobby groups. The twin movement of globalization and governmental deregulation produced private regulatory systems such as international commercial arbitration or debt-security and bond-rating agencies. Many of them are tied to a specific nation. As most transnational legal regimes could trace their origins back to American practices, ‘international’ and ‘transnational’ have come to express a new form of Americanization.\(^{47}\) In short, rethinking U.S. history in terms of its interconnectedness with the world may help us in turn assess anew globalization in terms of the ‘American century’ to pose new research questions.

For one, by paying closer attention to other sectors than the military and politics such as financial institutions and legal arrangements, further research will have to analyze non-state and market actors like missionaries, philanthropic organizations, and rotary clubs instead of exclusively focusing on international relations between sovereign nation-states. Such an approach will be more fruitful in mapping the relationship between Americanization and globalization over the past century. Equally important is to provincialize Europe in the narration of the U.S. role in the world by focusing instead on other global regions like Latin America, the Caribbean or the Pacific. It will help to reframe America’s history as part, instead of outside, of global history thus viewing globalization as a historically contingent phenomenon.

It is true that the very American companies that came to symbolize – the appeal or the threat of – Americanization faced severe limitations when they tried to export American production and consumption models in a global market. During the U.S.-led NATO bombings in 1999, Serbian store managers of the McDonalds succeeded in winning the hearts and minds of Belgrade citizens after the riots only by de-emphasizing its American origin. They introduced a ‘McCountry’, a domestic pork burger with paprika garnish, produced posters and buttons showing the company’s logo topped with a traditional Serbian cap, handed out free cheeseburgers at anti-NATO rallies, and offered the basement of one of its Belgrade restaurants as a bomb shelter.\(^{48}\) Only when the American mother company learned to accept local variations – McKroket in the Netherlands, wine in France, and marble furnishing and fountains in Rome to cite a few – did McDonalds succeed abroad. Even McDonalds had to adapt to local circumstances. Not only that: the American operations of the


mother ship no longer operates on the American mass-production principles that made the company in the first place but on the principles of flexibility of production pioneered outside the U.S. and on the tastes of the diet-conscious consumers. McDonalds is indeed simultaneously local, American, and global in its operations. These examples would lead to the conclusion that the proponents and the historically-minded skeptics of globalization, and the U.S. role in it, are correct in their assessment to temper the U.S. role in shaping and directing globalization during the twentieth century.

Economic historians Alan Milward, Jonathan Zeitlin, Mathias Kipping, and others, who questioned the real impact of Marshall Plan policies, have shown how European partners subverted American intentions for their own purposes during the *locus classicus* of Americanization. Cultural studies scholars like Arjun Appadurai celebrate the transformative role that receiving cultures play in the appropriation of American products to meet local needs and desires. American studies scholars as David Ellwood, Reinhold Wagnleitner, and Richard Pells also have shown how in receiving countries local economic and political elites partly have shaped consumer goods and culture. Yet, it would be a serious omission not to pay close attention to the mechanisms of the economic and cultural offensive and the power inequities involved. Kuisel warns against suggesting ‘any kind of parity between, for example, the Americanization of Europe and the Europeanization of America’. We know now how Eisenhower institutionalized the U.S. Information Agency through the ‘Campaign of Truth’, pushing American books, art, music, American Studies, educational reform, and magazine publication; planting pieces in local newspapers; facilitating the U.S. domination of the book market; and promoting jazz, rock-soul music, abstract expression, and modernist architecture as ‘typical’ American products and values.


51. Reinhold Wagnleitner, ‘*Here, there and everywhere*. Foreign politics of American popular culture’ (Hanover NH 2000); Pells, *Not like U.S.*., David W. Ellwood, *Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe, America and postwar reconstruction* (London 1992); Rob Kroes has written on the subject in many publications, but see for example, ‘Americanization: what are we talking about?’ in idem, *If you’ve seen one, you’ve seen the mall. Europeans and mass culture* (Urbana and Chicago 1996) 162-178.


because American expansionism turns out to be more complex and internally contradictory does not mean we should abandon the exploration of underlying power differences and forms of inequality, to paraphrase Van Elteren.54

Geopolitical and military contexts mattered a great deal in the expansion of global operations of U.S. businesses. American multinational companies like Boeing, Martin, and Bechtel engineering companies got their breaks as part of the war effort operating in tandem with the U.S. military-industrial complex and America’s overseas expansion into the world that included Europe and its former colonies. The California-based Bechtel’s engineering operations in Saudi Arabia became the country’s de facto Corps of Engineers (Rijkswaterstaat) intertwined with tacit agreements between the American government and the Saudi state on exclusive rights ruling the access and exploitation of oil fields. When Robert Woodruff took over the Coca-Cola Company in the 1920s it was teetering on the verge of bankruptcy, but with the help of Secretary of War George Marshall, Roosevelt allowed the Coca-Cola Company to build factories just behind the frontlines and use government warplanes for transportation to provide soldiers with the soft drinks wherever they went. By the end of the war, Coca-Cola operated sixty-three bottling plants across the globe on every continent with a profits climbing to 35.6 million dollars. During times of war and peace, government assistance marked one of the major stepping stone towards globalization for consumer goods. U.S. soldiers brought chewing gum, blue jeans, T-shirts, cigarettes, and Coca-Cola to the rest of the world. This too was the building block towards global expansion and domination. Clearly, the French farmers, bottling companies, and communists had many reasons to be worried in 1949. The American influence was not a figment of their imagination, but part of the U.S. military might and global thrust. The military was deeply implicated in the further development of civilian technologies and consumer goods. Scholars of globalization should not ignore the political and government-sponsored campaigns or the geopolitical and military contexts when studying globalization during the twentieth century.

Although the links between global business expansion and the American state have been less obvious at times in other instances, understanding them is nevertheless vital. Analysis of the links between American state and U.S. business needs to be integrating into our understanding of the process of globalization in the twentieth century in both economic and cultural terms. It is enrichment that we understand that culture has the ability for hybridization and that consumers are also active agents in the process, but we also need to understand that even innocuous phenomena like the culture of interna-

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tional science and tourism have been shaped by geopolitical contexts. In the first chapter of *American hegemony and the postwar reconstruction of science in Europe*, historian John Krige convincingly argues that scientific internationalism ‘came to mean something more than simply the circulation of knowledge and ideas...[but]...an effective instrument of foreign policy because of the massive scientific and technological imbalance in favor of the United States vis-à-vis its allies...’.

He shows how American civil-society organizations like Ford and Rockefeller foundations built infrastructures and values that became embedded in, and instrumentalized for, the projection of American power in postwar continental Europe. Christopher Endy similarly reconstructs the revealing story of American tourism in France to show the U.S. government encouraged American holidays in Western Europe as part of the Marshall Plan to close the dollar gap and how for example Parisian hoteliers both had to adapt to and sought to shape demands of the American tourist experience. The rise of the informal transnational exchanges over the Atlantic also helped manufacture strong national identities and state power. Such studies are the best examples of what future research should bring us: a sophisticated understanding of the hybridization of culture and an appreciation for active historical agents yet with a sharp eye for geopolitical contexts and power relations that shape our stories.

**Conclusion**

In this essay, I have sought to offer a counterpoint to the more tempered views of economic historians who stress the severe limitations of Americanization, the skeptics of globalization who point to the counter forces of regionalism and nationalism, or the cultural studies scholars who grant receiving cultures and consumers’ agency in the process of global acculturation. Recent scholarship of economic historians and cultural historians has been tremendously important in the detailing of what happens to American policies and intentions on the level of the firm or cultural artifact. They have provided intermediary social and economic actors and receiving cultures much-needed historical agency they had been lacking in earlier renditions of U.S. influence overseas. At the same time it is also important to pay close attention to the geopolitical frameworks in which these processes occur and to the webs of international civil society organizations that linked to the American political

55. Christopher Endy, *Cold war holidays. American tourism in France* (Chapel Hill 2004) and John Krige, *American hegemony and the postwar reconstruction of science in Europe* (Cambridge, MA 2006) represent a different case studies (tourism and science) that carefully integrate the geopolitical context into the story of appropriation and reception.
economy. These are not merely abstract networks and infrastructures, but institutions that transformed according their political context.

Too often globalization is narrated like a process void of central control, governmental direction, or politics. Similarly, the American federal state is often cast as too weak political institution to be granted a shaping role on the world stage of globalization. Future research, however, needs to examine more closely how the ties between the business community and state agencies while less visible than their European counterparts, are still crucial in u.s. directed foreign policy. The u.s. government, in close collaboration with the business community, furthered this networking revolution and established a world market economy as part of its global domination. Throughout the twentieth century, and before, the American nation-state has been committed to opening markets, deregulation, trade liberalization, and finance by taking the lead in shaping international agreements. Moreover, while economic superpower status is usually divorced from questions of military infrastructure in discussions of economics, military and civilian technologies often developed in close relation with each other. This phenomenon too deserves closer attention than it has received thus far. The u.s. government also systematically supported basic research in high-speed computers, telecommunications networking, and aviation – all technologies that are essential to the interconnected world of globalization and are evoked to represent forces of deterritorialization.56 Understanding Americanization only as a phase in the general trend of globalization is therefore limiting. It has been the continental u.s. that has led the way in the last century in historically specific ways. That process has been in part politically shaped and supported by a network of u.s. bases the world over which have produced dense technological nodes in geographically specific places.57 For the sake of argument, but at the risk of exaggeration, I have therefore attempted here to bring back America – the u.s. nation-state, corporate America, and the web of international civil-society organizations – as geopolitical actors in the story of globalization.

The effects of 9/11 have forced scholarship to rethink the framing of u.s. global power in new ways, generating a flurry of monographs that offers possibilities for much-needed cross-fertilization across disciplines. The paradigmatic shift in the discussion about America’s global position may help reassess the discussion of globalization in order to understand how McDonalds, Coca-Cola, and the military bases are intertwined with the American Century, as envisioned by Time Magazine publisher Henry Luce in 1938.

About the author

Ruth Oldenziel received her PhD from Yale University in American History in 1992 after graduate training at Smith College, the University of Massachusetts and the University of Amsterdam. She has been a fellow at Hagley Museum and Library in Delaware and the Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C. Since 1992 she has been appointed Associate Professor at the University of Amsterdam and has been a Senior Fellow at the Lemelson Center in Washington, D.C. and Social Research Institute in Amsterdam. She is professor at the TU Eindhoven. Her publications include books and articles in the area of American, gender and technology studies: *Boys and their toys in America* (1997); *Schoon genoeg* with Carolien Bouw (1998); *Making technology masculine: Men, Women and modern machines in America, 1870-1945* (1999); *Crossing boundaries, building bridges* with Annie Canel and Karin Zachmann (2000); *Dutch history of household technology in the twentieth century* (2001); *Gender and technology* (2003); Oldenziel is researching the material practices of the American Empire and preparing an Encyclopedia on the U.S. for a Dutch audience.

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